Part two – the tactical evolution

By Tim Penfold

The most notable talking point of pre-season has been the system that Bradford City lined up in. Having spent most of last season playing a 4-2-3-1, with occasional switches to a diamond midfield, the side has spent every minute of pre-season lining up in a back three, and it sounds like this could become the norm at the club.

Bradford City have attempted to play three at the back on numerous occasions during my time as a supporter, but have never really done it successfully or for a long period. Chris Kamara tried it, during the late 90s craze for wingbacks, while Jim Jefferies briefly used the system in a doomed attempt to rescue our Premier League status. Nicky Law’s last few games used the system, while Colin Todd was famously a 4-4-2 man – except for a brief spell in early 2006 where a back three worked spectacularly for one game, didn’t for the next couple and quickly got scrapped.

Then the system fell out of fashion somewhat – it worked against 4-4-2, giving an extra man at the back and in central midfield while sacrificing the flanks, but top level teams played 4-3-3 or 4-2-3-1, and the back three didn’t seem to have the answers to the problems those systems posed. The midfield no longer had the man advantage, and depending on the positioning of the wing backs the defence would either be 3v3 with spaces down the side for wide forwards to attack, or would have two spare players – both wide centre backs – but limit the attacking threat of the wing backs. It would either be defensively vulnerable or carry limited attacking threat.

It wasn’t until 2016/17 that we saw a return of the system to Valley Parade. At that point, there were two notable teams in England using a back three. Chelsea, under Antonio Conte, were romping away to a league title with a 3-4-3 formation – trusting in the back three, along with two very solid midfielders in front of them, to hold the line defensively, the wing backs were pushed very high and it often ended up looking like a 3-2-5. Back fours were literally outnumbered, with Chelsea always having a spare man, often at the back post.

Meanwhile, closer to City’s level, Chris Wilder at Sheffield United was solving the problem of the spare men in the system being the wide centre backs – he shifted Chris Basham back from midfield to the right of the back three, played Jack O’Connell on the left and allowed the spare defenders to join the attack as an extra man running from deep and overlapping into the box. Defending teams didn’t expect this, and it caused havoc as the Blades ran away with League One and later surged into the top flight.

As a result, we began to see Bradford City play a back three again. Stuart McCall, in his second spell, would sometimes use the formation to counter teams playing 4-4-2 – it saw particular use against Millwall, and we were so close to success with it at Wembley. But it still wasn’t a particularly successful system for the team – it was used during Simon Grayson’s forgettable spell, as well as on multiple occasions by Michael Collins, David Hopkin and Gary Bowyer – but it wasn’t used well. Stuart McCall tried it during the lockdown era, with Reece Staunton briefly impressing as a Sheffield United style wide centre-back – but when Staunton was injured, Ben Richards-Everton was very much miscast in that role, and the system collapsed.

It’s not that the system is inherently bad at this level. Stevenage, Stockport and Carlisle were all regular users of a back three last season, while three of the four promoted teams in 2021/22 did so using three at the back. Meanwhile, both teams promoted from the National League last season did so playing a back three.

It’s a useful way of getting an old-style strike partnership on to the pitch, while also not sacrificing the extra man in midfield like a 4-4-2 does. At this level, full-backs often come in two archetypes – good at defending, or good at attacking – and the extra man at the back allows you to play the second type without losing solidity. You do lose out on playing wingers, to the chagrin of WOAP’s Alex Scott, but building your team around an inconsistent wide man is a recipe for inconsistent results, and the good ones don’t last very long down here. Put simply, it works – except for City.

Mark Hughes, meanwhile, has mostly seemed to use it as a defensive system – bringing on an extra man at the back to see a game out (or spectacularly fail to do so a couple of times, most infamously against Carlisle). He hasn’t really had the personnel to play it effectively at times – the full backs are often a little too orthodox to play as wing-backs, and if we wanted to play two up front there were issues with the options for Andy Cook’s strike partner. The centre-backs, with the exception of Romoney Crichlow, were also not really suited to the system.

Some of these issues seem to have been addressed by the recruitment in the summer. Tyler Smith offers a pacy, direct threat alongside Cook, and Alex Pattison offers runs and a goal threat from deep that we didn’t really have from Alex Gilliead or Adam Clayton. We can also switch the balance of midfield, with only one pure holder in Smallwood, which allows us to fit Pattison and Jamie Walker into the same side more easily.

However, there’s still some gaps, most notably at left wingback – Liam Ridehalgh is too orthodox a full back and too slow to cover the entire left flank, while Clarke Oduor seems more comfortable as a wide forward. Gilliead has been covering the position in his new role as versatile squad player, but he’s right footed and not really a natural there.

In defence, a potential switch to a three is good news for both Timi Odusina and Ciaran Kelly. Kelly’s left-footedness gives the back line a decent balance, while the back three allows us to cover Odusina’s lack of physical and aerial presence much more than a two-man central defence would, while allowing us to benefit from Odusina’s speed. It’s the same reason that Reece Staunton looked significantly better under McCall than he has since – the role allowed the other two defenders to cover his weaknesses, and showcased what he was good at.

However, the defence has generally looked wobbly in the friendlies. The midfield and forward line has been pressing high, but is sometimes too easily bypassed, while the higher line is exposing the lack of pace in the first choice back line. The individual centre backs have a tendency to dive in, get dragged out of position and bypassed, and the defensive structure then falls apart. This is the advantage of a back four – defenders in England have been playing this system since they were kids, and know exactly where to go and how to cover. The back three is still less familiar, and the squad will need extra time on the training field to become truly comfortable with it.

This is Mark Hughes’ big gamble – with a year left on his contract, and a promotion charge expected, he’s shifted away from wingers and built a squad around a system that doesn’t have a history of success at Valley Parade. Will he emulate the likes of Plymouth and Forest Green, or will he be yet another manager who has tried and failed to bring a back three to Bradford City?

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